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VOLUME 31 SPRING, 1956 NUMBER 1
OUR INADEQUATE ATTORNEY'S LIEN STATUTES-
A SUGGESTION
GEORGE NEFF STEVENS*
The average attorney has little interest in, nor does he realize the
inadequacy of, the attorney's lien laws of his state-until he finds him-
self personally involved. Yet, a glance at the law reviews and pertinent
cases indicates that the organized bar and its individual members should
show more than a casual interest in the number and variety of prob-
lems arising in this field.'
Tim COMMON LAW
Before looking at the present picture, a few generalizations concern-
ing the attorney's lien at common law will prove helpful for purposes
of background and comparison: 2
First, the general or retaining lien. This lien gave an attorney the
right to retain the papers and documents of his client which came into
his (the attorney's) possession during the course of his professional
employment for the general balance of compensation due him for
professional services undertaken for the client. It was a possessory
lien. It was a passive lien; that is, it could not be enforced by fore-
closure and sale.
Second, the special or charging lien. This was a lien upon the
judgment obtained for for the client as a result of the attorney's pro-
fessional services for compensation for such services in that particular
* Dean, School of Law, University of Washington.
I Over fifty notes, comments, and articles have appeared on the subject under consid-
eration during the past twenty-five years. If interested, a check list is available at the
University of Washington Law School Library.
2 See for example, Baowx, PERSONAL PRoPERTY §§ 115 and 116, p. 500 et. seq. (2nd
ed., 1955).
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case. It was invented to protect attorneys from unscrupulous clients
by preventing such clients from receiving the benefits of the judgment
without paying for the services which made the recovery possible.'
Third, the right of off-set. This consisted of a right in the attorney
to apply all monies of the client received by the attorney in his profes-
sional capacity against the general balance of compensation due him
by the client for professional services.'
As of the end of 1955, thirty-one states and Alaska have some form
of attorney's lien statute.5 Before examining them, the better to
understand their coverage and their weaknesses, a look at the major
problems which have developed is definitely in order.
THE PROBLEmS
The problems may be classified, for convenience, into six groups:
1. Extent of lien coverage, property. What kinds of property are
subject to attorney's liens? Is the lien good for the general balance of
compensation due him, or only for the services rendered in a par-
ticular case? Does the kind of property involved have any effect on
whether the lien is for the general balance of compensation due or
for services in a particular case only?
2. Extent of lien coverage, persons. Does the lien protect the
attorney against parties, interested third persons, federal, state or
local governmental agencies?
3. Extent of lien coverage, services outside of court. Is court action
necessary? Is a dispute placed in the hands of an attorney sufficient?
a Contra: Gottstein v. Harrington, 25 Wash. 508, 65 Pac. 753 (1901), "Originally, at
the common law there was no attorney's charging lien." See also, Plummer v. Great
Northern Ry. Co., 60 Wash. 214, 110 Pac. 989 (1910).
4 Contra: State v. Lewis, 31 Wash. 75, 71 Pac. 778 (1903).
5 Ala., Alaska, Ark., Colo., Ga., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., La., Me., Mass.,
Minn., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.J., N.Y., N. Dak, Okla., Oreg., R.I., S. Dak.,
Tenn., Utah, Va., Wash., Wisc., Wyo. States with no general attorney's lien statutes:
Ariz., Calif., Conn., Del., District of Columbia, Fla., Hawaii, Md., Mich., Miss., N.H.,
N.M., N. Carolina, Ohio, Pa., S. Carolina, Texas, Vt., W. Va.
All footnote references to statutory material are based on the statutes and codes
herein below listed, and, in the interest of space economy no further reference to the
particular compilation employed will be made: CODE OF ALA. (1940) ; ALASKA Coa'.
LAWS ANN. (1949) ; ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN; COLO. REV. STAT. 1953; CODE OF GA. ANN.
(1936) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1947) ; SaTrrH-HuRD IL. ANN. STAT..; BENs IND. STAT.
ANN. (1946 replacement); IOWA CODE ANN. (1950); GEN. STAT. OF KAN. ANN.
(1949); Ky. REv. STAT. (1953); WEST'S LA. REv. STAT. ANN. (1950); REv. STAT. OF
ME. (1954); ANN. LAWS OF MASS. (1955); MINN. STAT. ANN. (1947); VRNONS'
ANN. Mo. STAT. (1948); REv. CODES OF MONT. ANN. (1947); Rxv. STAT. OF NEB.
1943-reissue of 1954; NEv. Comx. LAWS (1929); N.J. STAT. ANN. (1952); McKim-
NEY's CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF N.Y., JUDIcIARY LAW (1948); N. DAI. Rav. CODE OF
1943; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1936) ; OREG. REv. STAT. (1953) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS (1938) ;
S. DAx. CODE OF 1939; TENN. CODE ANN. (1934); UTAH CODE ANN. (1953); CODE
OF VA. (1950); REx. CODE OF WASH. (RCW); Wis. STAT. (1953); Wyo. Comp.
STAT. (1945).
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What about work done before boards or commissions? What about
arbitration?
4. Notice. How is notice of lien given? Does the notice require-
ment differ for different kinds of liens, for different kinds of property,
or where different classes of persons are or may be involved? When
does the lien become effective-the problems of settlements, assign-
ments, priorities and waivers?
5. Enforcement. May the attorney foreclose his lien? How?
6. Release of lien. Does the client, or an interested third party, have
a simple inexpensive, summary way of raising and settling disputes
arising out of claims for an attorney's lien? Is the attorney adequately
protected?
THE STATUTES
With these problems in mind, a look at attorney's lien statutes
throughout the United States is in order.
A number of states have statutes which state that an attorney has a
lien for his compensation,' or, for the general balance of his compen-
sation;" upon the papers of his client which have come into his pos-
session,' or, upon the papers of his client which have come into his
possession in the course of his professional employment; 9 upon money,10
property,1  personal property, 2  choses in action, claims and
demands,"' and causes of action 5 of his client in his hands." In this
group of statutes, the attorney's lien is created by the statute and it
0 Ala. Title Sec. 64; Alaska Sec. 26-8-1; Ga. Sec. 9-613; Minn. Sec. 481.13; Oreg.
Sec. 87.495; and RCW 60.40.010.
7 Colo. Sec. 12-1-10 and 12-1-11; Iowa Sec. 610.18; Kan. See. 7-108; Neb. Sec.
7-108; N. Dak. Sec. 35-2008; S. Dak. Sec. 32.1205; and Wyo. Sec. 2-116. It should be
noted that both N. Dak. and S. Dak. in spite of this general statement limit the use of
papers and money to the particular case by later provisions in the same act.8 Ga. Sec. 9-613; and Oreg. Sec. 87.495.
9 Ala. Title 46 Sec. 4 (1) ; Alaskan Sec. 26-8-1 (First) ; Colo. Sec. 12-1-10 and 12-
1-11; Iowa Sec. 610.18 (1) ; Kan. Sec. 6-108; Minn. Sec. 481.13 (1) ; Neb. Sec. 7-108;
N. Dak. Sec. 35-2008 (1) ; S. Dak. Sec. 32.1205 (1) ; RCW 60.40.010 (1) ; and Wyo.
Sec. 2-116.
10 Ala. Title 46, Sec. 64 (2) ; Alaska Sec. 26-8-1 (Second) ; Colo. Sec. 12-1-10 and
12-1-11; Ga. Sec. 9-613 (2) ; Iowa Sec. 610.18 (2) ; Kan. Sec. 7-108; Minn. Sec. 481.13
(2); Neb. Sec. 7-108; N. Dak. Sec. 35-2008 (2) ; Oreg. Sec. 87.495 (1) ; S. Dak. Sec.
32.1205 (2) ; RCW 60.40.010 (2) ; and Wyo. Sec. 2-116.
11 Colo. Sec. 12-1-10.
'1
2 Oreg. Sec. 87.495 (1).
13 Colo. Sec. 12-1-10.
14 Colo. Sec. 12-1-10; Ky. Sec. 30.200; and R.I. Chap. 450, Sec. 1.
15 R.I. c. 450, Sec. 1; Va. Sec. 54-70; and Wis. 256.37.
16 Note well, that in not a single state in this group, footnotes 10-15, is found a
requirement that these items come into the attorney's hands "in the course of his pro-
fessional employment." Was this intentional, or oversight? See Comment on this
point Isaminger, Attorney's Liens, 14 ORa. L. REv. 536 (1935).
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is effective without further notice or claim of lien on the part of the
attorney.
Continuing, several states have statutes which provide that the
attorney shall have a lien for his compensation, or for the general
balance of his compensation, 7 upon money in the hands of the adverse
party from the time of giving notice of the lien to that party;' 8 some
add the requirement that the notice must be in writing;'" another
provides that the attorney has a lien upon the interest of the client
in any money or property (real or personal) involved or affected by
the action from the commencement of the action, and that this lien
becomes effective as against third persons from the time notice is
given such persons. 0 Along the same lines, several states have statutes
which provide for an attorney's lien on the client's cause of action,
claim or demand, which becomes effective as against adverse parties
from the time notice,21 or written notice,22 is given to them. The lien
thus created attaches, upon notice, to the verdict, report, judgment,
decree, determination, decision, award or final order, and, in addition,
to any money or property which may be recovered. One statute
specifically states that the lien attaches not only to the decisions of
state courts but also to those of municipal or federal departments, and
is effective regardless of in whose hands the money or property recov-
ered may be.2
A rather common type of attorney's lien statute provides that the
attorney has a lien upon actions, suits and proceedings after the com-
mencement thereof, and upon judgments, decrees, orders and awards
entered therein, and upon the proceeds thereof in whomsoever's hands
they may be, for his agreed fees, or if no agreement, for the reasonable
value of his services.25 Several states include decisions by state,
17 See footnotes 6 and 7.
I8Alaska See. 26-8-1 (Third); Colo. Sec. 12-1-11; Neb. Sec. 7-108; RCW
60.40.010 (3) ; and Wyo. Sec. 2-116.
19 Iowa Sec. 610.18 (3); Kan. Sec. 7-108; N. Dak. Sec. 35-2008 (3); and S. Dak.
Sec. 32.1205 (3).2 0 Minn. Sec. 481.13 (3).
21 R.I. c. 450, Sec. 1. See also Ky. Sec. 30200, "If the records show the name of
the attorney, the defendant shall be deemed to have notice of the lien."
22 Ark. Sec. 25-301 (by registered mail) ; Ill. c. 13, See. 14 (by registered mail
stating attorney's interest) ; N.Y. Sec. 475-a (very detailed requirements) ; Va. Sec.
54-70; and Wis. Sec. 256.36.
23 Ark Sec. 25-301; Ill. c. 13, Sec. 14; and Ky. Sec. 30.200.
24 N.Y. Sec. 475 and 475-a.
25 Idaho Sec. 3-205; Mass. c. 221, Sec. 50 (authorized commencement) ; Minn. Sec.
481.13 (3) ; Mo. Sec. 484.130; Mont. Sec. 93-2120; Nev. Sec. 8923; N.J. Sec. 2A: 13-5;
N.Y. Sec. 475; Okla. Title 5, Sec. 6; Oreg. Sec. 87.495 (2) ; Tenn. Sec. 8035; and
Utah Sec. 78-51-41. See also, Ala. Title 46, Sec. 64 (2), (3), (4).
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municipal and federal boards and departments as well as courts.2" By
virtue of the statutory language found in most of these provisions, the
commencement of the action creates the lien, and no notice of claim
of lien, as such, is required." A few states, however, have required
notice of claim of lien in this type of lien situation.28
A somewhat different type of statute provides for an attorney's lien
upon a judgment, decree, order or award from the time of giving notice
to the adverse party,2" or, from the filing of notice with the clerk of
the court in which the judgment, etc., was entered, 0 or both.2" A few
statutes create such a lien on judgments and decrees without any
requirement of notice or filing of a claim of lien. In only a few of
the statutes in this group, as compared to the group in the paragraph
above, was the lien on the judgment, etc. specifically extended to the
money or property, real or personal, recovered.
A substantial number of states have provided that if an attorney
acquires an attorney's lien in accordance with the statutory require-
ments, such lien shall not be affected by any settlement between the
parties to the controversy, either before or after judgment, decree,
order or award."'
In several instances, the attorney's lien statutes have established
the priority of the attorney's lien: For example, the attorney's lien
on suits, judgments and decrees for money,"5 or, upon actions, suits
and proceedings after the commencement thereof," shall be superior
2 8
1Mass. c. 221, Sec. 50; and N.Y. Sec. 475.27 Idaho Sec. 3-205; Mass. c. 221, Sec. 50 (authorized commencement) ; Mo. Sec.
484.130; Mont. Sec. 93-2120; Nev. Sec. 8923; N.J. Sec. 2A: 13-5; N.Y. Sec. 475; Oreg.
Sec. 87.495 (2) ; Tenn. Sec. 8035; and Utah See. 78-51-41. See also Ala. Title 46, Sec.
64 (2), (3), (4).
28 Colo. Sec. 12-1-10 and 12-1-11; Minni. Sec. 481.13 (3), (4), (5); and Okla. Title
5, Sec. 6 (Oklahoma provides that, "Notice shall not be necessary provided that such
attorney has filed such pleading in a court of record, and endorsed thereon his name,
together with the words 'lien claimed'."). See also, Ga. Sec. 9-613 (4) "All persons
bound if claim of lien on property recovered is filed within 30 days after recovery of
same. '
20 Min. See. 481.13 (5).
30 Colo. Sec. 12-1-10; Ind. Sec. 4-3619; Iowa Sec. 610.18 (4) ; N. Dak. Sec. 35-2008
(3) ; S. Dak. Sec. 32.1205 (4) ; and RCW 60.40.010 (4).
31 Alaska Sec. 26-8-1 (Fourth).
32 Ky. See. 30.200, "If the records show the name of the attorney, the defendant shall
be deemed to have notice of the lien"; La. Sec. 9:5001.
33 Ky. Sec. 30.200; La. Sec. 9:5001; and Minn. Sec. 481.13 (3), (4), (5).
84 Ala. Title 46, Sec. 64 (2) ; Ark. Sec. 25-301; Idaho Sec. 3-205; Mo. Sec. 484.130
and 484.140; Mont. Sec. 93-2120; Nev. Sec. 8923; N.J. Sec. 2A: 13-5; N.Y. Sec. 475
and 475-a; Okla. Title 5, Sec. 6; Oreg. Sec. 87.495 (2); R.I. Chap. 450, Sec. 1; Utah
Sec. 78-5141; Va. Sec. 54-70; and Wis. Sec. 256.36 and 256.37. See also, Ky. Sec.
30.200, "If the parties, before judgment, in good faith compromise or settle their differ-
ences without payment of money or other thing of value, the attorney for the plaintiff
shall have no claim against the defendant for any part of his fee."
3 Ala. Title 46, Sec. 64 (2).
S8 Oreg. Sec. 87.495 (2).
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to all liens except tax liens; in cases of demands in suit and judgments,
the lien shall be notice to everyone that the attorney has a first lien
for the amount of his fee;17 the attorney is granted a lien on all judg-
ments obtained, and on the property recovered, to take rank as a first
privilege (lien) thereon.3s
Set-off problems have not been dealt with widely. Several statutes
provide that the attorney's lien on a judgment is subordinate to the
rights existing between the parties to the action or proceeding."9 On
the other side, one state has a statute which states that executions shall
not be set-off against each other in such a way as to hurt the attorney's
lien.4"
Several states have faced the problem of whether the attorney should
have a lien where the state is a party. One statute provides that the
attorney shall have a lien upon all claims put in his hands, "except
those of the state.",1 In a second jurisdiction, the attorney can
perfect his lien against the state or a political subdivision by proper
notice. Do statutes which give the attorney a lien on any money
or property which may be recovered "in whatever hands they may
come," found in a number of states 43 protect the attorney's lien
against the state or its political subdivisions? In view of the common
law attitude towards liability of the state, it would seem wise to make
a specific reference to the state's, or political subdivision's, responsi-
bility in this matter.
In the area of establishment and enforcement of liens, several
statutes provide that the attorney may apply money in his hands to
the satisfaction of the lien and claim 44 and retain papers in his hands
until the claim is satisfied. The attorney in possession of personal
property of his client may sell the same under certain conditions
according to the statute of one state.46
A statutory right to enforce the attorney's lien is provided in a
number of statesY.4  The proper procedure varies considerably: For
37 Colo. Sec. 12-1-10.
88 La. Sec. 9:5001.
89 Alaska Sec. 26-8-1 (Fourth) ; and Minn. Sec. 481.13 (5).
40 Me. c. 118, Sec. 28.
41 Ky. Sec. 30.200.4 2 Mass. c. 221, Sec. 50.
43 Ala. Title 46, Sec. 64 (3); Ark. Sec. 25-301; Ga. Sec. 9-613 (3); Idaho Sec.
3-205; Minn. Sec. 481.13 (4), "wherever situated"; Mo. Sec. 484.130; Mont. Sec.
93-2120; Nev. Sec. 8923; N.J. Sec. 2A: 13-5; N.Y. Sec. 475 and 475-a; Okla. Title 5,
Sec. 6, "wherever found"; Oreg. Sec. 87.495 (2) ; and Utah Sec. 78-51-41.
"Ala. Title 46, Sec. 64 (1) ; Ga. Sec. 9-613 (1) ; and Oreg. Sec. 87.495 (1).
45 Ala. Title 46, Sec. 64 (1) ; Ga. Sec. 9-613 (1) ; and Oreg. Sec. 87.495 (1).
46 Ga. Sec. 9-614.
47 Ala. Title 46, Sec. 52, and Sec. 64 (3) ; Mass. c. 221, Sec. 50.
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example, the enforcement may be instituted by motion,48 by petition, 9
by the proper civil action," by foreclosure," by summary proceeding,52
by an action for equitable relief, 3 or, by the same procedure that the
client has."
From the client's point of view, several state statutes provide that
any interested person may release the attorney's lien by executing a
bond in a sum double the amount claimed, or in a sum to be fixed by
the court, payable to the attorney, with security to be approved by
the clerk of the court, conditioned to pay any amount finally found
due the attorney, which amount may be ascertained by suit on the
bond. Such states also provide for automatic release of the attor-
ney's lien unless he furnishes a detailed statement of his claim for
services. 6 Several statutes, after setting up an attorney's lien, provide
in later sections that an attorney who receives money or property of
his client in the course of his professional employment, and refuses
to pay or deliver it in a reasonable time, after demand, is guilty of a
misdemeanor," or may be required to show cause why he should not
be punished for a contempt. 8 These statutes also establish a pro-
cedure under which the attorney so charged may ask that his right
to a lien be determined, or that the court require the client to post
security in an amount sufficient to satisfy the lien, when determined,
as a condition of release of the lien; but, none of them provide spe-
cifically for enforcement or establish an adequate enforcement pro-
cedure.59
Contrasted with this rather drastic approach several states have
established a more equitable procedure. In one jurisdiction the judg-
ment debtor may obtain release from the attorney's lien and any
further claims by paying the full amount of the judgment or decree
into court, and in several others the statute provides that upon request
of the client the court may determine and enforce the lien.6"
48 Ala. Title 46, Sec. 52.
40 Ark. Sec. 25-302; Ill. c. 13, Sec. 14; N.J. Sec. 2A: 13-5; and N.Y. Sec. 475
and 475-a.
50 Colo. See. 12-1-10, which has been held to be a suit in Equity, see Fillmore v.
Wells, 10 Colo. 228, 15 Pac. 343 (1887).
51 Ga. Sec. 9-614; Minn. Sec. 481.13 (6).
r2 Kan. Sec. 7-109; Mass. c. 221, See. 50 B; and Minn. Sec. 481.13 (6).
5s Minn. Sec. 481.13 (6); and R.I. c. 450, Sec. 1.
54 Oreg. Sec. 87.495 (2).
55 Iowa Sec. 610.19; N. Dak. Sec. 35-2009; and S. Dak. Sec. 32.1206.
56 Iowa Sec. 610.20; N. Dak. Sec. 35-2009; and S. Dak. Sec. 32.1206.5 7 Iowa Sec. 61021 and 61022
58 Minn. Sec. 481.14; and RCW 60A0.020.




Among these statutes are the answers to most of the problems posed
earlier in this paper. However, deciding which provisions are most
effective, a study of the operation of an attorney's lien statute in a
particular state-in this instance, Washington-will serve to high-
light the problems of statutory interpretation and construction, and
thus, the need for careful draftsmanship.
In Washington the lien for attorneys' fees has been regulated by
statute since 1863."' In 1881 a provision was added setting forth how
and where notice of lien on a judgment should be ffled. 2 No other
changes have been made, although the revisors of the Revised Code of
Washington took some liberties with the statutory language. The
present statute, as it appears in RCW 60.40.010 is as follows:
Section 60.40.010 Lien created. An attorney has a lien for his
compensation, whether specially agreed upon or implied, upon:
(1) The papers of his client which have come into his possession
in the course of his professional employment;
(2) Money in his hands belonging to his client;
(3) Money in the hands of the adverse party in an action or pro-
ceeding, in which the attorney was employed, from the time of giving
notice of the lien to that party; and
(4) A judgment to the extent of the agreed sum (if the services
were rendered under a special agreement) otherwise the value of the
services performed by him in the action, from the time of filing notice
of his lien or claim with the clerk of the court in which the judgment
is entered, which notice shall be filed with the papers in the action in
which the judgment was rendered, and an entry made in the execution
docket, showing name of claimant, amount claimed, and date of filing
notice.
Before examining this statute in detail it would seem expedient to
see what the Supreme Court of Washington has said about it in general.
A few quotations will serve:
Generalizations
1. "The cases necessarily proceed upon the assumption that the
right to an attorney's lien in this state rests upon the statute, and there
is no common law or equitable lien in Washington."6
2. "The statute of this state is merely declaratory of the common
law on the question of the general or retaining lien...."
-' LAiWs oF WAsHINGTON TERRITORY 1863, p. 406, Sec. 12.
62 Code of 1881, Sec. 3286.63 Humptulips Driving Co. v. Cross, 65 Wash. 636, 118 Pac. 827 (1911).
64 Gottstein v. Harrington, 25 Wash. 508, 65 Pac. 753 (1901).
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3. "As there was no such common law lien, the [charging] lien, if
any exists, must be derived from the statute."65
Now, a look at the detail. The statute provides that "An attorney
has a lien for his compensation, whether specially agreed upon or
implied, upon" the four items thereafter listed. Does the statute give
him the right to use the lien for the general balance of compensation
due him for all legal services performed for a particular client, or is
the lien limited to compensation for services in a specific case only?
What does "for his compensation" mean? Does it have a different
meaning under each of the four subsections?
Papers
RCW 60.40.010 (1) provides for a lien upon:
The papers of his client which have come into his possession in the
course of his professional employment;
The Washington Supreme Court has held that this is a codification
of the common law retaining lien; that such papers may be held for
the general balance of compensation due, and not just to secure pay-
ment in the particular case in which the papers were obtained; that
this lien on papers, being a retaining lien, cannot be enforced, but
may merely be used to embarrass the client; that the lien may not be
assigned; and that loss of possession of the papers means loss of the
lien. 6 Thus, the court has read into the Washington statute, so far as
subdivision (1) is concerned, all of the attributes and characteristics
of the common law attorney's lien on papers of the client which have
come into the attorney's possession in the course of his professional
employment.
Money
RCW 60.40.010 (2) provides for a lien upon:
Money in his hands belonging to his client;
Does it matter how the money comes into the attorney's hands?
You will note that the requirement found in subdivision (1) "which
came into his hands in the course of his professional employment" is
missing in subdivision (2). Was this accidental or intentional? Does
that make any difference? May the attorney hold money of his client
which comes into his hands, regardless of in what capacity, to satisfy
65 Plummer v. Great Northern Ry Co., 60 Wash., 214, 110 Pac. 989 (1910).
68 Gottstein v. Harrington, 25 Wash. 508, 65 Pac. 753 (1901). See also, Hudson v.
Brown, 179 Wash. 32, 35 P.2d 756 (1934).
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his claim for the general balance of compensation due for all legal
services, or may the money be held only for services rendered in the
particular case by virtue of which it came into the attorney's posses-
sion? It is obvious that if the money involved came into his hands in
other than a professional capacity, it can be held, if at all, only under
a claim of lien for the general balance of compensation due for all
legal services rendered. On the other hand, money from a particular
case might or might not be available for the general balance of com-
pensation due, depending upon the kind of lien which the court holds
was created by subdivision (2) of the statute.
Thus, the language of the statute gives rise to several problems:
1. Is the lien created by this provision a retaining lien, or
2. Is it a charging lien?
3. If it is a retaining lien, do the common law characteristics
attach?
4. If it is a charging lien, what are its characteristics? and
5. Must the money come into the attorney's hands in his capacity
as an attorney?
The Washington Supreme Court has held that an attorney has a
charging, and not merely a retaining, lien upon monies which come
into his possession in the course of his professional employment; that
the money thus in his hands is properly held for the general balance
of compensation due; and that the lien on monies under subdivision
(2) is not just a passive lien, like that on papers, but is enforceable.
6 T
This interpretation, interestingly, gives subdivision (2) characteris-
tics of both the common law retaining lien (right to hold for the
general balance of compensation due) and the charging lien (a right
to enforce).
The Washington Supreme Court has not passed on question 5 above.
As a problem of statutory interpretation is it significant that subdivi-
sion (1) contains the restriction "in the course of his professional
employment" whereas subdivision (2) does not? How should, or will,
this point be decided? In the interim, the extent of the attorney's lien
is, to say the least, uncertain!
Personal Property
RCW 60.40.010 (1) and (2) make no reference to kinds of per-
sonal property other than (1) papers and (2) money; nor does the
statute specifically limit potential liens to these two classes of personal
67 Price v. Chambers, 148 Wash. 170, 268 Pac. 143 (1928). See also, Gottstein v.
Harrington, 25 Wash. 508, 65 Pac. 753 (1901).
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property. If the generalizations of the Washington Supreme Court,
mentioned previously, are controlling, then the Washington lawyer's
right to claim a lien on the personal property of his client which comes
into his possession is definitely restricted. Unfortunately, no Wash-
ington Supreme Court case has met this question head on. In the
two cases in this state in which the issue might have been raised, the
attorney's right to claim a lien on the property involved was assumed.
One of the cases involved warrants,8 the other, a negotiable instru-
ment."  Do these cases involve "papers," or "money," or are they
precedents, weak perhaps but precedents, for the right to claim an
attorney's lien on a chose in action?
Money-Adverse Party
RCW 60.40.010 (3) provides for a lien upon:
Money in the hands of the adverse party in an action or proceeding,
in which the attorney was employed, from the time of giving notice of
the lien to that party; ...
Does the Washington attorney have a right to claim a lien on money
in the hands of the adverse party for the general balance of compensa-
tion due, or only for fees for services in the "action or proceeding"?
What kind of a lien is this? At common law it would be classed as a
charging lien, since the possessory requirement of the retaining lien
is missing. A dictum in a Washington Supreme Court case calls it a
special or charging lien.70 But, since liens which at common law were
retaining liens have been given charging lien advantages by the Wash-
ington Supreme Court, may not the court give charging liens some of
the advantages of retaining liens-at least where such an interpreta-
tion would be consistent with the language of the statute?
If the common law approach is adopted, and no Washington case
has passed on this, then the lien will be limited to compensation for
services in the particular case. Such a simple solution, however, is not
possible here, for the difference in the language of subdivision (3) and
subdivision (4) raises an important point of statutory construction.
Both subdivisions (3) and (4) would be, at common law, charging
liens. In subdivision (4), but not in (3), nor (2), nor (1), the lien is
limited specifically to "services performed by him in the action."
While the legislative intent is not as clearly expressed as it ought to
CS In re 8th Avenue, 82 Wash. 398, 144 Pac. 533 (1914).
09 In re Dungeness Timber Co., 50 Fed. Supp. 370 (W.D., Wash., 1942).
70 Gottstein v. Harrington, 25 Wash. 508, 65 Pac. 753 (1901).
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be, is it not sufficiently plain? In view of this difference in language,
and the construction given by the court to the lien coverage under
subdivisions (1) and (2), the Washington Supreme Court might well
hold that the coverage of subdivision (3) extends to the general bal-
ance of compensation due for all professional services to the particular
client.
Because subdivision (3) does not involve possession by the attorney,
notice of the claim of a lien becomes important. The statute simply
provides that the attorney has a lien from the time of giving notice.
When may such notice be given? Do the words "in an action or
proceeding" mean that the attorney cannot obtain a lien on money in
the hands of the adverse party until a law suit is commenced? If so,
what constitutes a "commencing"? The Washington Supreme Court
has held that "in order for a lien to arise from notice under this sec-
tion [3), there must be an action or proceeding pending against the
adverse party in some court.., of this state." '
If you want and need a lien, and there are times when you may, 2
get your law suit started, as quickly as possible!
The Washington Supreme Court has held that failure to give the
notice provided by the statute defeats the lien as to the adverse party."
What kind of a notice is required? Must it be in writing? To whom
should the notice be given-to your client, the opposing party, his
lawyer? How do you give it? The statute is silnt. A decision of the
Washington Supreme Court holds that "... the notice must necessarily
be in writing since it must be filed with the clerk of the court and
with the papers in the action."7 The court's bifocals must have
slipped, for it has read into subdivision (3) the notice requirements of
subdivision (4)! And, although the reasoning of the case is obviously
wrong, that is the law of Washington until changed!
Several other problems remain. Must the notice state the amount
of the claim? We can not tell. Does the lien attach to property, real
or personal, other than money, in the hands of the adverse party?
Apparently, not. What happens to a lien properly perfected under
subdivision (3) after the cause of action is reduced to a favorable
judgment? Must the attorney obtain a new lien under subdivision (4)?
Unfortunately, there are no answers, as yet, to these questions.
7 1 Plummer v. Great Northern Ry Co., 60 Wash. 214, 110 Pac. 989 (1910).
72 Kearn v. Chicago M. & P. S. Ry. Co., 201 Fed. 404 (W.D., Wash., 1913).
7 Ibid.
7 4 McRea v. Warehime, 49 Wash. 194, 94 Pac. 924 (1908).
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Judgments
RCW 60.40.010 (4) provides for a lien upon:
A judgment to the extent of the agreed sum (if the services were
rendered under a special agreement) otherwise the value of the services
performed by him in the action, from the time of filing notice of his
lien or claim with the clerk of the court in which the judgment is
entered, which notice shall be filed with the papers in the action in
which the judgment was rendered, and an entry made in the execution
docket, showing name of claimant, amount claimed, and date of filing
notice.
The statutory language would, by common law standards, create a
charging lien, both as to enforceability"5 and as to extent of coverage.
But, to what does the lien attach? Just to the judgment? If so, how
does one enforce the lien? What about the fruits of the judgment?
Does the lien attach to money, to real or personal property seized and
sold, or subject to seizure and sale, under execution, to real or personal
property which is the subject matter of the judgment, to real or per-
sonal property cleared by, or returned as a result of, the judgment?
The statute gives no clue, and no Washington case has discussed the
problem.
Is the point at which the attorney may perfect his lien, such as it
may be, adequate? In other words, when is there "a judgment" upon
which or against which a lien may be filed under subdivision (4)?
The Washington Supreme Court has ruled that ". .a lien cannot
attach until the written judgment is formally entered.... " In the
interim between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment,
the attorney may well, as he did in that case, lose his chance for pay-
mentl Little solice, I am sure, were the words of the court, "Where
it appears that parties have conspired to defeat the attorney's com-
pensation, a court will, on proper showing, allow the case to proceed
at the attorney's instance to protect his lien." For the court added that
since the attorney had no lien, the rule did not apply!
The Problem of Settlements
Settlements by conniving clients have been a problem. The Wash-
ington Supreme Court, in absence of a statute, has set down several
guiding principles:
7r Gottstein v. Harrington, 25 Wash. 508, 65 Pac. 753 (1901) (dictum).
76 Cline Piano Co. v. Sherwood, 57 Wash. 239, 106 Pac. 742 (1910).
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1. A client may at any stage of a case compromise or dismiss his
action or suit, even though his attorney may object. 7
2. This is so even where the attorney by agreement with his client
has a lien on the judgment, and the attorney has given notice of this
agreement to the adverse party through his attorney. The reason-if
the attorney wants a lien which will be good against the adverse party
he must comply with the statutes.7
3. Where it appears that parties have conspired to defeat an attor-
ney's compensation, a court will, on proper showing, allow a case to
proceed at the attorney's instance in order to protect his lien.79 Is this
proposition contrary to 1 above? It would appear that it is not, for
in neither case had the attorney perfected his lien prior to the settle-
ment, and, in addition, proposition 1 goes only to the right of a client
to settle without the attorney's consent, and not to the effect of settle-
ment on an existing lien.
4. Where the attorney's lien has attached, it cannot be affected by
a subsequent compromise or settlement of the case by the parties
where they have proper (i.e. statutory) notice of the lien."
5. But, a settlement entered into before an action is commenced
cannot be the subject of a lien, as money in the hands of the adverse
party, because provision for such a lien applies only after action is
started and proper notice is given.8 '
Applying these principles, there is no way, at present, for the Wash-
ington attorney to protect his fees, by lien, against settlements made
prior to the time a suit is commenced, or between the time a judge
decides a case in favor of the client and the date of the entry of the
formal judgment.
The Question of Assignments
Assignments have also caused trouble. The Washington Supreme
Court has held that an assignment of a judgment, made in good faith
and without collusion (by whom?) is not subject to an attorney's lien
upon the judgment filed subsequent to the assignment.8 2 The facts
7 7McRea v. Wareheim, 49 Wash. 194, 94 Pac. 924 (1908) ; Plummer v. Great North-
ern Ry. Co., 60 Wash. 214, 110 Pac. 989 (1910).
78 McRea v. Wareheim, supra note 77; Plummer v. Great Northern Ry. Co., supra
note 77.
70 Cline Piano Co. v. Sherwood, 57 Wash. 239, 106 Pac. 742 (1910); Kearn v.
Chicago M. & P. S. Ry. Co., 201 Fed. 404 (W.D., Wash. 1913).
80 Cline Piano Co. v. Sherwood, supra note 79; Kearn v. Chicago M. &. P. S. Ry.
Co., supra note 79. The McRea case was not mentioned in the opinion in the
Cline case I81 Plummer v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 60 Wash. 214, 110 Pac. 989 (1910).82 Humptulips Driving Co. v. Cross, 6 Wash. 636, 118 Pac. 827 (1911).
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show that the assignee knew of the attorney's participation in the case,
but had no knowledge of a claim of lien. Yet, is this not a loop-hole
in the attorney's lien law by means of which a client, bent on knavery,
may reap the harvest of the attorney's labor without paying a cent?
The court did not mention an earlier Washington case which involved
the assignment of a claim by the client during the trial. In this earlier
case it was held that the fact that the attorney had knowledge of the
assignment by his client of the claim which was in litigation would not
estop the attorney from claiming a lien upon the judgment recovered,
where there had been no express waiver of the right of lien.8"
These cases are in conflict. In both, the assignment was made before
the attorney had perfected his lien. In the earlier case he was given a
priority; in the later case, he was not.
Does this mean that the assignment by a client of his cause of action
before it is reduced to judgment is subject to an attorney's lien filed
on the judgment in due course; whereas an assignment of the judg-
ment, after judgment and before an attorney's lien is filed, takes
priority over a claim of lien which is perfected after the assignment
was made? It would seem so !
Agreements for Attorney's Lien
The Washington Supreme Court has held that an agreement for an
attorney's lien, made with the client, will be strictly construed against
the attorney," and that such an agreement does not give the attorney
a lien against a third party," even if such person has notice of the
agreement.8
Priorities
In summary, the Washington Supreme Court has established the
following priorities:
1. An attorney's possessory lien on negotiable paper, and the pro-
ceeds thereof, takes precedence over the claims of creditors of the
client, even in reorganization or bankruptcy proceedings. 7
2. An attorney's lien, once perfected, cannot be altered or affected
by a subsequent settlement, but
8 3 Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Hart, 13 Wash. 651, 43 Pac. 937 (1896).
84 In re 8th Avenue, 82 Wash. 398, 144 Pac. 533 (1914).
8 5 Kearn v. Chicago M. & P. S. Ry. Co., 201 Fed. 404 (W.D., Wash. 1913).86 McRea v. Wareheim, 49 Wash. 194, 94 Pac. 924 (1908) ; see also, Plummer v.
Great Northern Ry. Co., 60 Wash. 214, 110 Pac. 989 (1910).8 7 In re Dungeness Timber Co., 50 Fed. Supp. 370 (W.D., Wash., 1942).
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3. A settlement takes precedence over the right to claim an attorney's
lien.8"
4. The assignee of a client's cause of action takes it subject to the
attorney's right to claim a lien upon the judgment.89
5. However, the assignee of a client's judgment, where assignment
was made in good faith, takes it free of the attorney's right to claim
a lien."
6. The attorney's right to a lien upon a judgment takes precedence
over a right claimed by the judgment debtor to set off a judgment
obtained by the judgment debtor against the client after the judgment
involved was entered but before the attorney's lien was perfected.9
Waiver or Loss of Lien
The Washington Supreme Court has laid down several rules with
respect to what acts will result in a waiver, or loss of lien.
1. Parting with possession. 2
2. Failure to reserve the lien when stipulating with the client or third
parties concerning the property on which the lien is claimed.9"
3. Being present and participating in satisfaction of the judgment
upon which the lien is claimed.94
4. But, knowledge of assignment of a cause of action during litiga-
tion will not estop the lawyer from claiming a lien upon the judgment
recovered where there has been no express waiver of the right to claim
a lien.9"
Funds Upon Which a Washington Attorney May Not Claim a Lien
No Washington case has discussed this problem. However, the
Attorney General has stated in an opinion that an attorney's lien will
not attach to money paid under RCW 51.32.040 (Workmen's Com-
pensation) ."
How May the Attorney Enforce His Lien?
What better starting point on the enforcement problem than a quota-
tion from a Washington Supreme Court decision?:
88 Cline Piano Co. v. Sherwood, 57 Wash. 239, 106 Pac. 742 (1910); McRea v.
Wareheim, 49 Wash. 194, 94 Pac. 924 (1908).
89 Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Hart, 13 Wash. 651, 43 Pac. 937 (1896).
90 Humptulips Driving Co. v. Cross, 65 Wash. 636, 118 Pac. 827 (1911).
91 Spokane Security Finance Co. v. Bevan, 172 Wash. 418, 20 P.2d 31 (1933).
92 Gottstein v. Harrington, 25 Wash. 508, 65 Pac. 753 (1901).
93 Jensen v. Kohler, 93 Wash. 8, 159 Pac. 978 (1916).
94 Holbrook v. McKee, 147 Wash. 386, 266 Pac. 187 (1928).
95 Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Hart, 13 Wash. 651, 43 Pac. 937 (1896).
9 6 OPINIONS OF THE ATToRNEY GENERAL, Wash., 1929-30, p. 549.
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The statute, [RCW 60.40.010], which authorizes an attorney's
lien on a judgment, makes no provision for the procedure to be
followed in enforcing the lien nor of any procedure that would
destroy it.0
7
As a result, the court has had to make the rules as the problems have
arisen. The cases indicate that:
1. the attorney has no right of action by which he can enforce his
lien upon papers or personal property of his client in his possession."
2. the attorney has a charging and not merely a retaining lien on
money of the client in his hands. But, the court fails to state what
difference it makes. 9 A federal case in Washington says that "the
attorney would have the right.., to retain and apply the proceeds
upon the amount due them...,,oo [italics added]. Has Washington
adopted the common law off-set approach where money is concerned?
I think not. The Supreme Court of Washington has held, in a criminal
case involving an attorney, that a claim of lien confers no right to
convert the funds in his hands to his own use.'' It is not clear from
the cases just how an attorney can get for his own use the money owed
him, from the money he holds under a claim of lien, if the client refuses
to cooperate.
3. after a claim of lien has been filed, the attorney may "bring an
action to foreclose and have the right to the lien and its reasonable-
ness determined in a proper forum."''° But, unfortunately not only
is the language of the cases rather vague as to how, but also the cases
are not on all fours with the proposition suggested.
4. the attorney may cause execution to issue on a judgment against
which he claims an attorney's ien.
103
U7 State ex rel. Angeles B. & M. Co. v. Superior Court, 89 Wash. 342, 154 Pac. 603
(1916). Title 60 of the RCW lists 18 different liens for various and sundry purposes.
All means of enforcement of these liens is specifically provided in sixteen instances.
For obvious reasons no enforcement procedure appears in the sevententh-lien for
internal revenue. This leaves only the attorney's lien without statutory enforcement
procedures.
0- Gottstein v. Harrington, 25 Wash. 508, 65 Pac. 753 (1901) ; In re 8th Avenue,
82 Wash., 398, 144 Pac. 533 (1914).
El Gottstein v. Harrington, supra, note 98; Hudson v. Brown, 179 Wash. 32, 35
P.2d 756 (1934) ; Price v. Chambers, 148 Wash. 170, 268 Pac. 143 (1928).
100 In re Dungeness Timber Co., 50 Fed. Supp. 370 (W.D., Wash., 1942).
101 State v. Lewis, 31 Wash. 75, 71 Pac. 778 (1903). See also, State v. Gilliam, 94
Wash. 243, 161 Pac. 1194 (1917).
102 State ex rel. Angeles B. & f. Co. v. Superior Court, 89 Wash. 342, 154 Pac. 603
(1916). See also, the language of McRea v. Wareheim, 49 Wash. 194, 94 Pac. 924
(1908); Price v. Chambers, 148 Wash. 170, 268 Pac. 143 (1928) ; and Keyes v. Ahren-
stedt, 164 Wash. 106, 1 P.2d 843 (1931).
10 3 Cline Piano Co. v. Sherwood, 57 Wash. 239, 106 Pac. 742 (1910). (The suit was
unsuccessful, not because the attorney had no right to so proceed, but because the court
found that the attorney had not perfected his lien.) See also, Humptulips Driving Co.
v. Cross, 65 Wash. 636, 18 Pac. 827 (1911).
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-5. the attorney may file a petition in a probate proceeding asking
for protection of his claim to compensation, have his attorney's lien
determined, the amount of his fee fixed, and get an order of payment,
as part of the distribution of the estate.'"
6. an attorney has no cause of action against the adverse party who
has paid the client, a known insolvent, even though such party had
actual (written) notice of the attorney's claim of lien. The court
assumes, however, that the attorney would have had a good cause of
action if he had had a lien.
105
7. a federal case out of Washington State has held that an attorney
with a perfected lien may by petition get an order from the court
directing payment of his fee from money paid into court pursuant
to a judgment in the federal court in a condemnation proceeding.'
8. an attorney will be permitted to intervene to protect his per-
fected lien.'0 7
Rights of the Client or Third Person
RCW 60.40.020 Proceeding to compel delivery of money or papers.
If an attorney refuses to deliver money or papers to a person from or
for whom he has received them in the course of professional employ-
ment, he may be required by an order of the court in which an action,
if any, was prosecuted, or if no action was prosecuted, by order of a
judge of a court of record, to do so within a specified time, or show
cause why he should not be punished for a contempt.
RCW 60.40.030 Procedure when lien is claimed. If the attorney
claims a lien upon the money or papers, the court or judge may:
(1) Impose as a condition of making the order that the client give
security, in the form and amount to be directed, to satisfy the lien,
when determined in an action;
(2) Summarily inquire into the facts on which the claim of a lien
is founded, and determine them; or
(3) Refer it, and upon the report, determine the facts as in other
cases.
The Washington Supreme Court has held that under these provi-
sions the client is entitled to have the court summarily determine the
amount of the lien and fix the amount of the bond to be given to
secure the attorney's claim for fees, and, upon filing such bond, to the
immediate return of his property.0 '
10 In re Estate of Wren, 163 Wash. 65, 299 Pac. 972 (1931).
'O5 Plummer v. Great Northern Ry Co., 60 Wash. 214, 110 Pac. 989 (1910).
106 United States v. Moulton and Powell, 188 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1951).
107 Spokane Security Finance Co. v. Bevan, 172 Wash. 418, 20 P.2d 31 (1933).
108 In re 8th Avenue, 82 Wash. 398, 144 Pac. 533 (1914) ; State v. Gilliam, 94 Wash.
243, 161 Pac. 1194 (1917). See also, State ex rel. Trumble and Plumley v. Sachs, 3
Wash. 371, 28 Pac. 540 (1891).
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These statutes do not apply to property delivered (pledged) to the
attorney as security for his fees.109
The Washington Supreme Court has ruled that the summary method
of procedure provided by these sections of the statute is not exclusive.110
Thus, actions have been brought by clients and interested third parties
to restrain execution by the attorney;"I to recover money retained by
the attorney under claim of lien;112 to have an attorney's lien set
aside;"' 8 and by way of interpleader." 4
Right to Trial by Jury
The Washington Supreme Court has ruled that there is no right
to trial by jury when the issue involves a lien for attorney's fees,
since this is a matter of equitable cognizance."
Lien on Judgments in the Federal Courts in Washington
There is no federal attorney's Hen act. Efforts to enact such a
statute thus far have failed."' However, Washington attorneys trying
cases in the federal district courts in Washington are protected to
the extent of the state statute above discussed. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has ruled that,
It appears to be the settled rule that judgments rendered in federal
courts in states where such charging liens are recognized by statute or
local law, will be held subject to such liens.'17
Conclusions
It is quite apparent from the above discussion that the attorney's"
lien statute is inadequate. It should also be apparent that the defects
are such that correction should come through legislation rather than
109 Golden v. Hyde, 117 Wash. 677, 202 Pac. 272 (1921).
110 Jensen V. Kohler, 93 Wash. 8, 159 Pac. 978 (1916).
11' Cline Piano Co. v. Sherwood, 57 Wash. 239, 106 Pac. 742 (1910) (by judgment
debtor); Holbrook v. McKee, 147 Wash. 386, 266 Pac. 187 (1928) (by judgment
debtor); Humptulips Driving Co. v. Cross, 65 Wash. 636, 118 Pac. 827 (1911), (by
judgment debtor).
112Jensen v. Kohler, 93 Wash. 8, 159 Pac. 978 (1916) (by trustee of corporation
which had been defendant's client); Price v. Chambers, 148 Wash. 170, 268 Pac. 143
(1928) (by client).
113 State ex rel. Angeles B. & M. Co. v. Superior Court, 89 Wash. 342, 154 Pac. 603
(1916) (by client).
"4 Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Hart, 13 Wash. 651, 43 Pac. 937 (1896) (by judgment
debtor).
115 Hudson v. Brown, 179 Wash. 32, 35 P.2d 756 (1934) ; In re the Estate of Wren,
163 Wash. 65, 299 Pac. 972 (1931); Price v. Chambers, 148 Wash. 170, 268 Pac.
143 (1928).
116 See, R. Berger, Attorney's Lien in federal courts: A protection that is long over-
due, 39 A.B.A.J. 131 (Feb. 1953).
17 United States v. Moulton and Powell, 188 F2d 865 (9th Cir. 1951).
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judicial interpretation and interpolation. The proposed act, appended
hereto, is merely a suggestion-a start. It is hoped that interested bar
associations will appoint committees to prepare a statute suited to the
local needs.
Finally, much of this discussion has been concerned with the plain-
tiff's attorney's right to a Hen. But what of defendant's lawyer?
DEFENDANT'S ATTOiNEY-RIGHT TO LiEN
It is, and has been, assumed that the defendant's attorney has the
same right as the plaintiff's lawyer to a lien on papers, money, or, where
permitted, property, which have come into his possession. But, what
about his right to claim a lien where he has successfully defended a
law suit? A number of the states have provided for a lien for the
defense attorney where he has filed a counterclaim. 18 But, only two
states have made a statutory effort to provide the defendant's attorney
with a charging lien-Georgia, where the attorney has successfully
defended in an action to recover real or personal property;"" and
Louisiana, which provides:
A special privilege is hereby granted to attorneys at law for the
amount of their professional fees on all judgments obtained by them,
and on the property recovered thereby, either as plaintiff or defendant,
to take rank as a first privilege thereon. 20
A PROPOSED ATTORNEY'S LIEN STATUTE
Attorney's Liens: Extent, Notice, Priority, Enforcement and Release
A. Extent: An attorney has a lien for the general balance of all com-
pensation due him from his client, for professional services to
such client whether specially agreed upon or implied, as provided
in this section:
(1) Upon all papers, personal property and money of his client
in his possession;
(2) Upon any claim, cause of action or defense placed in the
attorney's hands, which shall attach to a verdict, report,
determination, decision, judgment, decree or final order in
his client's favor of any court, or, of any state, municipal,
federal or other governmental agency, and to any money or
property, real or personal, which may be recovered, or cleared,
i'sIdaho, Sec. 3-205; Mo., Sec. 484-130; Mont, Sec. 93-2120; Nev., Sec. 8923;
N.Y., Sec. 475; Okla., Title 5, Sec. 6; and Utah, Sec. 78-51-41.
"19 Ga., Sec. 9-613 (5).
120 La., Sec. 9:5001.
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as a result of such claim, cause of action or defense, no matter
in whose hands (including governmental agencies) such
money or property, real or personal, may be; provided how-
ever, that this section shall not apply where the money or
property involved is specifically excepted from claims or liens
by law.
B. Notice sufficient to create the lien; parties affected:
(1) Possession of papers, personal property or money by the
attorney shall be sufficient notice to create the lien as against
all the world.
(2) Notice, in writing, to the adverse party or, where the adverse
party is represented by counsel, to his attorney, that the attor-
ney has been retained with respect to a particular claim, cause
of action or defense, shall be sufficient to create the lien as to
the adverse party and his assignees, and no further or addi-
tional notice shall be required.
(3) The commencement of an action, suit, proceeding or hearing
on the claim or cause of action or the filing of a defense thereto,
in a court or before any state, municipal, federal or other gov-
ernmental agency, shall be deemed sufficient notice to create
the lien as against all the world, and no further or additional
notice shall be required.
C. Priority: When the lien provided in section A attaches by virtue
of section B, it shall be superior
(1) to all other liens, except tax liens and liens of record properly
perfected prior thereto, and
(2) to any settlement or assignment by or between the parties or
third persons, or any of them, made thereafter.
D. Enforcement and Release of Lien: The Superior Court, upon peti-
tion of an attorney claiming a lien, or of the client or an interested
third party contesting the amount or validity of a claim of lien, may
proceed summarily, without a jury, on not less than five day's
notice to interested parties, to adjudicate the rights of the parties
involved on the issues raised, and enforce, continue, or release such
lien on such terms and conditions as justice may require.
